This research theoretically analyzes the role of irreversible fertility decisions in economic growth in the presence of idiosyncratic ability shocks after childbirth. It argues that the irreversibility constraint delays the growth process by distorting the resource allocation between the quantity and quality of children. In underdeveloped stages, where family size is locked into large levels, education investment places a heavy …nancial burden on households. The impossibility of ex post fertility adjustment then deprives some competent children of learning opportunities. In more developed stages, by contrast, family size locked into smaller levels facilitates education investment even in some incompetent children. A redistributive policy to enhance aggregate human capital and the growth performance is proposed for each stage.
Introduction
Nowadays, it is widely recognized that developing skills and knowledge is one of the most e¤ective means not only to improve individual well-being but also to advance the economy as a whole. Indeed, the United Nations has set providing universal access to primary education by 2015 as one of its Millennium Development Goals. Whether developing regions make full use of this growth strategy is however hard to say, given that the net enrollment rate in their primary schools was 91 percent in 2015 (United Nations, 2015, p. 4) . One of the …nancial hindrances to the education goal is the increase in the number of potential students, which is expected from the total fertility rate of nearly 3.0 in 2010-2015 in less developed regions excluding China (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social A¤airs, 2017, p. 124). 1 Regarding advanced countries, it appears that some of them face the opposite situation.
Japanese households cannot a¤ord to maintain replacement-level fertility partly because of their growing enthusiasm about the education of their children. 2 On the supply side, almost 40 percent of private universities did not meet their student quota in the 2017 academic year (Promotion and Mutual Aid Corporation for Private Schools of Japan, 2017, p. 2). As Clark (2012) points out, the under-enrollment will naturally urge them to accept a broader range of applicants. This leads to the declining quality of higher education. In the United States, education investment yielded negative returns for graduates from 6.5 percent ( 120/1833) of colleges/universities, whereas the total fertility rate dropped to 1.88 during 2010-2015. 3 A plausible conjecture from these observations is that the resources of those economies are allocated inadequately between the quantity and quality of labor and the bias changes its 1 A positive e¤ect of fertility decline on years of schooling is reported by Joshi and Schultz (2007) , who assess a family planning and maternal-child health program implemented in Matlab, Bangladesh. Ashraf et al. (2013) predict, incorporating this e¤ect into a simulation model, that a lower time path of fertility will lead to a higher path of per capita GDP in Nigeria over the 21st century. 2 According to a questionnaire survey by National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (2017, p. 72) , the average planned number of children, 1.87, is lower than the average desired number of children, 2.27, for …rst-married couples whose wives are between 45 and 49 years of age. For …rst-married couples of all age groups whose wives are below 50 years, the cost of child rearing and education is the most important reason behind this gap (ibid., p. 74) . 3 See the 2017 college ROI report by PayScale (https://www.payscale.com/college-roi, accessed on October 6, 2017), and also United Nations, Department of Economic and Social A¤airs (2017, p. 132) for the fertility rate. direction depending on the stage of economic development. In this sense, economies may go through a transition from under-to over-investment in education during the growth process. 4 The transition is consistent with a recent trend in returns to schooling over the last decades. Montenegro and Patrinos (2014) estimate returns to schooling from data of 139 economies, revealing a declining trend since the 1980s.
The present paper aims to shed light on the underlying mechanism of the aforementioned transition by developing a growth theory that incorporates the irreversibility of fertility decisions. This constraint restricts parental fertility adjustment in response to idiosyncratic ability shocks on their children. 5 The resulting accumulation of human capital alters technological progress, the return on education, and fertility decisions by the next generation. The irreversibility constraint therefore intervenes dynamically between population, education, and growth. This paper also examines how the government can enhance growth performance by redressing the balance of resource allocation.
The long-run, macroeconomic approach of this research distinguishes itself from the previous literature. The inequality and growth literature, which has ‡ourished since the 1990s, a¢ rms the possibility of under-investment in human capital in the presence of capital market imperfections (cf. Galor and Zeira, 1993; Moav, 2002; Mookherjee and Ray, 2003) . 6 Other theoretical studies argue that information imperfections, along with incomplete market, may induce individuals' precautionary savings for human capital investment (cf. Gould et al., 2001; Aiyagari et al., 2002) . 7 None of these …ndings is fully satisfactory in terms of this 4 Under-investment in education is referred here to as a situation in which aggregate human capital is enhanced by shifting the aggregate resources for child rearing from the quantity to the quality of children. The opposite case applies to over-investment in education. The present paper de…nes both types of investment from the macroeconomic rather than the individual viewpoint. It is not concerned with skill mismatch between workers and their occupations [see, for example, Sicherman (1991) for this type of mismatch]. 5 Goldstein et al. (2003, p. 487 , Table 2 ) compare mean personal ideal family size and mean personal expected family size for young women by using the Eurobarometer 2001 survey. They report that the former measure is larger than the latter by 0.2 to 0.4 points in major European countries (p. 486). A similar pattern applies to the United States (Hagewen and Morgan, 2005, p . 509, Figure 1 ). These disparities are consistent with this paper's assertion that some households in the developed stages are prevented from adjusting their family sizes upward. 6 Apart from capital market imperfections, Dávila (2018) argues that the failure to internalize the externality of aggregate human capital brings about the social suboptimality of private investment in fertility and in education. The present paper, by contrast, attributes ine¢ ciency in the two types of investment to the irreversibility of fertility decisions. See also Footnote 21. 7 Gould et al. (2001) consider the eroding e¤ect of technological progress, which is biased and random across sectors, on human capital. Aiyagari et al. (2002) highlight the lack of insurance markets for ability paper's objective.
This research models an overlapping generations economy that features the following key elements. First, individuals derive utility from the quantity and quality of their children as well as from their own consumption, as stated by Becker and Lewis (1973) . Second, in contrast to the standard literature, there is a time lag between fertility and education decisions, and idiosyncratic ability shocks occur in between. Fertility decisions are assumed to be completely irreversible for ethical, legal, and physical, and other reasons. 8 Once determined, the number of dependents is not adjustable in either direction, and such in ‡exibility is the source of sunk cost. Third, in line with the formulation by Galor and Moav (2000) , technological progress is skill-biased in the sense that its acceleration stimulates the incentive for higher education. Forth and …nally, the invention of new technology depends on the aggregate amount of human capital, which is the fruit of parental child rearing.
Taking these elements into consideration, the dynamic theory developed later demonstrates a scenario of economic development. In the early development stage, where technological progress is sluggish, education investment is not fruitful for parents whose children have average ability. Assuming that children with average ability will be born to them, all households aim to concentrate their child-rearing resources on the quantity of children. 9 While children reveal their true abilities by the time of schooling, fertility adjustment to a change in education expenses is infeasible at that time. With the locked-in fertility decision, revising the initial education plan involves an unexpected reduction in household consumption.
Accordingly, the irreversibility constraint prevents some households from coping with education costs. The resulting biased allocation of parenting resources entails under-investment in education. To complicate matters, the constraint brings about a counter e¤ect on growth:
as well as the lack of loan markets. 8 See, among others, Fraser (2001) and Doepke and Zilibotti (2005) for theoretical arguments underlying the irreversibility of fertility decisions. In relation to schooling, a recent study by de la Croix and Doepke (2009) focuses on the lock-in e¤ect of fertility decisions on individuals'voting preferences to account for the di¤erences in public education systems across countries. 9 While this strong assumption makes a great contribution to the tractability of the dynamic model, it will not be essential for the outcome of the distorted resource allocations. See Appendix B for an extension to the expected-utility framework. Nakagawa and Sugimoto (2011) similarly analyze the lock-in e¤ect on the education decision by assuming that adult individuals have the same expectation about their own abilities.
It increases the aggregate amount of parenting resources through the provision of education support, against the initial plan, by households whose children turn out to be signi…cantly competent. The combination of these two opposing forces is generally ambiguous.
As a means to mitigate under-investment in education, the present paper proposes an ability-based subsidy for education …nanced by a universal tax on child rearing. Such a redistributive policy tends to be e¤ective in early phases where the constraint is binding for children in the upper tail of the ability distribution. The rationale of this result is that subsidizing their skill acquisition would make a substantial contribution to the formation of aggregate human capital.
Technological progress driven by human capital accumulation eventually alters households' (ex ante) stances toward education, which is followed by a major fertility decline.
Education investment in this stage is attractive even for parents whose children have average ability. With the aforementioned belief on children's abilities, all adult individuals choose smaller family sizes to cope with the cost of future education.
Since the family size is locked into small levels, cancelling the education plan certainly diminishes the utility from children while it leaves a su¢ cient budget for consumption.
Households therefore invest in education unless their children turn out to be signi…cantly incompetent, leading to over-investment in education. On top of that, those who cancel the education plan shift their budgets away from child rearing. Both of these e¤ects work adversely on the accumulation of aggregate human capital. In order to mitigate the overinvestment, it is useful to stimulate average fertility instead of educating low-ability children, for example, through a universal subsidy for child rearing …nanced by an ability-based tax on education.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the structure of the baseline model, in which the fertility adjustment is unrestricted, and then considers optimal decisions on fertility and education. These individual choices are aggregated for an analysis of the dynamic behavior of the entire economy. Section 3 builds the mainline model by introducing the irreversibility constraint into the baseline model. Section 4 demonstrates that the constrained economy goes through a transition from under-to over-investment in education. It also investigates the workings of redistributive policies that are designed to improve the growth performance. Section 5 summarizes the discussions and presents some directions of the future research. The appendix provides the mathematical proofs of some key results and also discusses about the robustness of the model.
The Baseline Model: An Unlocked Economy
The economy has an overlapping-generations structure and operates over an in…nite discrete time horizon, t = 0; 1; 2 . 10 A single homogeneous good is produced in one sector by employing human capital, and labor productivity improves through learning by doing. The economy is closed and abstracts from capital markets.
Adult individuals have all information except the abilities of the children they intend to have. Ability shocks occur after childbirth, and then parents decide whether to provide education support for their children. In making the education decision, they can adjust the number of their children as much as they want without any cost. In other words, fertility decision is "unlocked"and reversible. Because this property makes the ex ante optimization meaningless, the baseline model is essentially viewed as a perfect foresight model in which fertility and education decisions are made simultaneously.
Firms
In perfectly competitive environments, …rms generate a single homogeneous good by employing human capital (i.e., e¢ ciency units of labor) with a linear technology. The level of output per worker in period t, denoted as y t ; is determined through the production function
where A t , H t , and N t are the levels of technology, aggregate human capital, and working population, respectively, in period t: For the sake of simplicity, the price of the …nal good is normalized to unity. As a result of pro…t maximization by price-taking …rms, H t maximizes 10 The baseline model is an extension of the model developed by Galor and Weil (2000) , who explore the mechanism underlying the demographic transition in the long-term growth process. In return for allowing the heterogeneity of individuals'abilities, the baseline model needs some modi…cations in, for example, the household budget constraint, the production function of individual human capital, and the creation of new technology, in order to keep its tractability. the aggregate pro…t A t H t w t H t , where w t is the market wage rate per unit of human capital in period t. In the competitive labor market considered herein, w t is adjusted so that the resulting pro…t is neither negative nor in…nitely large, leading to w t = A t :
Households
A new generation is born at the beginning of each period and lives for two periods. Generation t, born in period t 1, comprises a continuum of individuals existing on the interval
Environment
Consider the lifetime of an individual i 2 [0; N t ] of generation t, born in period t 1: In the …rst period (childhood), the individual has no wealth and engages in skill acquisition, possibly with parental support e i t 1 0. In the second period (adulthood or parenthood), the individual acquires h i t > 0 e¢ ciency units of labor to earn wages, while giving birth to n i t units of identical children all at once. 11 Child rearing incurs a cost of w t ( + e i t ) per child, where > 0 and e i t are the …xed cost and the education cost, respectively. 12 The remaining income is used up for consumption, c i t ; so that no bequests are left to the o¤spring. It follows that the budget constraint is
The utility of individual i of generation t, u i t , depends on not only consumption in adulthood but also aggregate income of his/her children. Each of these children, indexed by j 2 [0; N t+1 ]; acquires h i;j t+1 e¢ ciency units of labor in period t + 1: 13 With these considerations, the utility function is formulated as
where 2 (0; 1) measures the degree of parental altruism.
11 Siblings do not have to be born simultaneously. One may assume that when childbirth is sequential, their (identical) ability level is unveiled after the youngest child is born.
12 Unlike in Galor and Weil's (2000) model, the costs of child rearing, and e i t , are measured not in labor time but in e¢ ciency units of labor, h i t . The resulting fertility decision depends on h i t and, as shown later, the result facilitates the construction of a dynamical system. Moav (2005) takes a hybrid approach by measuring only the …xed cost of child rearing in time. 13 Adult individual i in period t has a continuum of children on [0; n i t ]; which is a subset of [0; N t+1 ]:
Production of Human Capital
Children may di¤er in the level of education and innate ability across, but not within, households, meaning that no heterogeneity exists among siblings. The labor supply in e¢ ciency units obtained by child j, born of parent i in period t, is determined according to the production function
where a i t 2 [0; 1] and e i t 0 denote the levels of his/her ability and education, respectively, and g t+1 0 is the rate of technology growth between periods t and t + 1: h is interpreted as the potential level of individual human capital. 14 In line with the formulation by Galor and Moav (2000) , the function h above satis-…es three key properties for any a i t 2 (0; 1) and g t+1 > 0. 15 First, education investment has a discrete and positive impact on the formation of human capital; more precisely, lim e i t ! e 0 h(e i t ; a i 14 Throughout the paper, one may plausibly assume that h g t+1 to exclude an unrealistic case in which some members of generation t + 1 end up with a negative level of human capital. 15 With respect to the erosion e¤ect below, their theoretical formulation is inspired by Nelson and Phelps (1966) . 16 The discreteness of h with respect to e i t , which brings about a binary education choice, is not essential either under-or over-investment in education, while it contributes to the tractability of the model. It is the irreversibility of fertility decisions, not the discreteness of h; that may limit the ex post adjustment of education to the unconstrained levels. 17 Throughout the present paper, f x (x; y) denotes the partial derivative of a function f with respect to x:
Optimization
In the absence of the irreversibility constraint on the fertility decision, households may adjust the quantity of children depending on their observed abilities. For this reason, it makes no sense to consider the ex ante parental decision, and the resource allocation problem facing each household is simpli…ed to one-step optimization with no uncertainty.
Given h i t ; a i t and g t+1 , adult individuals aim to maximize their own utility as price takers. By substituting Eqs. (2) and (4) into Eq. (3), the maximization problem faced by parent i in period t is
subject to (n i t ; e i t ) 0: First, consider the fertility decision. The objective function exhibits the logarithmic form and strict concavity with respect to n i t . Hence, the …rst-order optimality condition yields
implying that a …xed fraction of labor, ; is devoted to child rearing regardless of the income level. It would be historically plausible to impose a necessary condition for sustainable population growth. That is to say, the upper bound of fertility is above the replacement level:
Next, consider the education decision. Substitution of Eq. (6) into Eq. (5) reveals that
subject to e i t 0: As is evident from Eq. (4), the education choice is binary: It is rational for parents in period t to choose either e i t = 0 or e i t = e. If g t+1 = 0; education investment is not at all productive, and thus e i t = 0 is chosen. Regarding the case with g t+1 2 (0; h), letã t be a critical ability level above which choosing e is strictly preferable. Then, from Eq. (7), whereã ( h) = 0 andã g (g t+1 ) < 0 8g t+1 > 0. Since the relative skill h( e; a i t ; g t+1 )=h(0; a i t ; g t+1 ) increases strictly with the ability level a i t , the education decision by parent i in period t is monotonic with respect to a i t in a way such that
e if a i t >ã (g t+1 ):
(9)
where g t+1 2 (0; h). 18 Thus, in contrast to the fertility decision, the education decision is independent of the income level. Figure 1 represents these results graphically. No one invests in education as long as technological progress is so sluggish thatã t > 1. A rise in g t+1 raises the relative skill h( e; a i t ; g t+1 )=h(0; a i t ; g t+1 ) and thereby makes education investment more attractive for each parent, leading to a decline inã t : Education investment begins to spread whenã t falls below unity.
Macroeconomic Variables
Although siblings are identical, no genetic ability is inherited within dynasties. Technically speaking, a i t is identically and independently distributed across households and periods ac-cording to a cumulative distribution function F . The function has standard properties such that F (a) = 0 8a 0, F (a) = 1 8a 1; and F 0 (a) > 0 8a 2 (0; 1):
Aggregate Human Capital and Population
Substituting Eq. (9) into Eqs. (4) and (6) gives the evolution of aggregate human capital as 19
where H 0 = R N 0 0 h i 0 di and the growth factor is de…ned as
The function has the following properties. First, d (g t+1 )=dg t+1 < 0 8g t+1 > 0 because the acceleration of technological progress delays the accumulation of human capital by making part of the acquired skills outdated and useless. 20 In addition,
The second property holds because if g t+1 is su¢ ciently low, no one invests in education and (g t+1 ) is close to the upper bound of the fertility rate, h= in Eq. (A1). The last property is due to the linearity of the erosion e¤ect: If g t+1 is su¢ ciently large, the adverse e¤ect is substantial enough to generate negative human capital.
As Lemma 1 below con…rms, the unconstrained parental decision maximizes the aggregate human capital of each household, n i
Proof. The resource constraint yields
Then, in light of Eq. (10),
where b i t is exogenous. Since the education decision e i t = e (a i t ; g t+1 ) satis…es Eq. (7), it maximizes the integral in Eq. (13).
Eq. (13) shows that aggregate human capital H t+1 depends on two factors: the amount of parenting resources, b i t , and the e¢ ciency of its allocation between n i t and e i t . As will become apparent, these are the channels through which the irreversibility of fertility decision a¤ects economic growth.
As with Eq. (10), the level of working population in period t + 1 is derived as follows:
where (g t+1 )
This is a continuous, nonincreasing function such that (g t+1 ) = =( + e) 8g t+1 h. It is strictly decreasing in g t+1 as long as 0 <ã (g t+1 ) < 1: The adverse e¤ect of technological acceleration on the working population is due to the substitution e¤ect, i.e., the shift in parenting resources from the quantity to the quality of children.
The Average Levels of Human Capital, Fertility, and Output
Let h t be the average level of human capital in period t. Then Eqs. (10) and (14) yield
for t 1; and h 0 = H 0 =N 0 : This result indicates two opposing forces of technological acceleration on h t : While a rise in g t depresses aggregate human capital H t through the erosion e¤ect, it decreases the working population N t through the substitution e¤ect.
Let n t be the ratio of the child to the adult population in period t: In the single-parent economy considered here, n t is interpreted as the average fertility rate in period t: Then, it follows from Eqs. (14) and (15) that
for t 1; and n 0 = (g 1 )h 0 : A rise in g t+1 has a negative pressure on n t through the substitution e¤ect on N t+1 . Nevertheless, in light of Eq. (15), the dynamic behavior of n t is generally unclear when g t monotonically changes over time.
Eqs. (1) and (15) reveal that output per worker in period t, expressed as y t = A t h t ;
depends on g t as well as on A t : Hence, y t and A t grow at the same rate in a steady-state equilibrium where g t is constant.
Technology
In the economy considered here, creation of new technology is a by-product of economic activities by adult individuals. Speci…cally, the amount of inventions in period t+1, A t+1 A t ;
increases proportionally with the aggregate amount of human capital in period t + 1, H t+1 (cf. Jones, 1995; Nakagawa et al., 2015) . Considering Eq. (10), the evolution of technology is described as
where > 0 measures the degree of learning by doing and A 0 > 0 is historically determined.
In other words, the technology level in period t + 1 is a linear combination of the existing technology, A t ; and aggregate human capital in period t + 1: Furthermore, note that H t in the second line above is the source of the income e¤ect on fertility in period t:
The Dynamical System
This section characterizes the evolution of the unlocked economy by exploring the dynamic interaction between technology and human capital. As will become apparent, the growth rate of technology monotonically converges to a positive level in the long run. In light of Eq. (17), the growth rate of technology is determined in a self-ful…lling way:
where g t+1 in (g t+1 ) is a perfectly forecasted value. A rise in H t increases g t+1 through population expansion, whereas a rise in A t decreases g t+1 through technology catch-up.
Let x t (A t A t 1 )=A t be referred to as the innovation rate in period t, which is the ratio of new inventions to the total amount of technologies. When x t is high, a large proportion of present technologies are attributed to new inventions rather than to pre-existing technologies.
Noting that x t = H t =A t from Eq. (17), one may arrange Eq. (18) to obtain
where (g t+1 ) > 0 and d (g t+1 )=dg t+1 < 0 8g t+1 2 (0; h], recalling Eq. (11). Eq. (19) therefore shows a one-to-one positive relationship between x t > 0 and g t+1 2 (0; h]. This result is straightforward from Eq. (18) and using the de…nition of g t+1 , one obtains 1=x t+1 = 1=g t+1 + 1; or equivalently,
which indicates a positive and concave relationship between g t+1 and x t+1 . This result is also intuitive from Eq. (17). Since a rise in g t+1 implies that H t+1 increases more than the pre-existing technology A t , it also increases more than their linear combination A t+1 , leading to a higher innovation rate in period t + 1:
Eqs. (19) and (20) show that x t is linked to x t+1 by way of g t+1 : These two equations therefore constitute a one-dimensional …rst-order autonomous system for x t : Given the initial condition x 0 = H 0 =A 0 ; the system nails down the trajectory of x t and accordingly those of g t and the other endogenous variables in Section 2.3.1. In view of Eq. (10), the initial quantity of aggregate human capital, H 0 , depends on two exogenous factors: the initial working population, N 0 ; and the distribution of individual human capital h i 0 . Eqs. (19) and (20) also reveal that the direction of growth in x t depends on the magnitude relationship between the growth factor of aggregate human capital, (g t+1 ); and that of technology, 1 + g t+1 : Lemma 2 below asserts the existence of a unique, globally stable steadystate equilibrium such that x t is constant over time.
Lemma 2 Under Eq. (A1), there exists a unique value g > 0 such that ( g ) = 1 + g and
Proof. Since (g t+1 ) in Eq. (11) is a continuous, strictly decreasing function such that lim g t+1 !0 (g t+1 ) > 1, there exists a unique value g > 0 such that
Hence, the result follows from Eqs. (19) and (20).
Given these results, Figure 2 depicts the evolution of the unconstrained economy in the g-x plane. As long as the initial innovation rate x 0 = H 0 =A 0 is positive, both x t and the growth rate of technology, g t , monotonically change in the same direction and converge toward their respective steady-state levels, x and g : If g is so large thatã ( g ) < 1;
children with a i t 2 (ã ( g ); 1] receive education in the steady-state equilibrium. That is to say, education investment prevails at least partially in the long run. 22 Recalling the proof of Lemma 2 and the discussion in Section 2.3.1, one …nds that g also equals the long-run growth rate of aggregate human capital and of output per worker.
Lastly, note that the education choice given by Eq. (9) is desirable for technological progress between periods t and t + 1. According to Lemma 1, it maximizes the growth factor of aggregate human capital for any g t+1 > 0. Hence, no other education choice can make a downward shift in the x t curve in Figure 2 as long as the child-rearing budget w t h i t is unchanged.
The Mainline Model: A Locked-in Economy
This chapter extends the baseline model by introducing the irreversibility of fertility decisions. The "locked-in" economy herein operates in the same way as before, except that family sizes cannot be either reduced or enlarged after the occurrence of unexpected ability shocks. 23 Under such an environment, there exist households whose reactions to the shocks 23 The assumption of perfect irreversibility in the present paper would be relaxed by allowing individuals to have children in two periods, between which unexpected ability shocks occur. The multi-period approach is taken by Iyigun (2000) for di¤erent research objectives from the present paper. The author develops a growth model with no uncertainty and demonstrates that the timing of childbearing is delayed by the accumulation of human capital. are bound to their initial plans.
Households
Households'resource allocation problem is divided into two steps. At the time of childbirth (in ex ante optimization), parents plan for future education investment believing that their newborn children have average ability. After childbirth (in ex post optimization), they unexpectedly …nd the true ability levels of their children and thus may be inclined to alter their initial plans.
Ex Ante Optimization: Childbirth and Education Planning
An individual i of generation t (parent i in period t) decides the quantity of children, n i t ; along with the planned level of education investment, e p t : This decision making builds on the belief that his/her children will have average ability a 2 (0; 1). 24 As a result, e p t coincides with the education choice for average-ability children in the unlocked economy.
Under the circumstance, one may apply Eqs. (6) and (9) to ex ante decision making.
Thus, it follows that
where h i t is the source of the income e¤ect on the fertility decision. Regarding the education plan, e p t = e ( a; g t+1 ) = 8 < : 0 for g t+1 2 [0;g]; e for g t+1 2 (g; 1):
whereg is, as indicated in Figure 1 , a critical value such thatã (g) = a. In view of Eq. (8),
In contrast to the fertility decision, the absence of the income e¤ect makes education planning homogeneous within generations.
Ex Post Optimization: Education Investment
After a one-time childbirth, the adult individual i in period t unexpectedly observes the ability level of his/her children, a i t . The gap between a i t and the expected level a may induce the individual to modify the education plan. Now that n i t in Eq. (21) is taken as given, Eqs. (5) and (22) reveal that the actual level of education investment, e i t ; is such that
subject to e i t 0:
Eq. (24) has three notable implications. First, unlike in ex ante optimization, education investment is determined as a trade-o¤ with consumption, c t ; not with the quantity of children, n t . Second, there is no income e¤ect on e i t . This is because a rise in h i t proportionally increases the quantity of children, n i t ; with no impact on the budget constraint in Eq.
(2). Third, the sunk cost of child rearing, =( + e p t ), is the source of the lock-in e¤ect on education investment. If is su¢ ciently small, for example, any household choosing e p t = 0 beforehand have so many children that it cannot a¤ord e i t = e for them. An extreme case such as this is beyond the scope of the present paper and thus is excluded on the assumption that 25 ( + e) < 1:
First, consider the case with g t+1 = 0: Then, Eqs.
(2) and (4) yield V ( e; a i t ; 0) < V (0; a i t ; 0) and education investment is not attractive for any adult individual in period t: Next, turn to the case with g t+1 2 (0; h): Then, there exists a critical ability level,ã t , for which parents in period t are indi¤erent between ex post education decisions; i.e., V ( e;ã t ; g t+1 ) = V (0;ã t ; g t+1 ): In light of Eq. (22), the critical value is given bỹ Since the ratio V ( e; a i t ; g t+1 )=V (0; a i t ; g t+1 ) strictly increases with a i t ; the ex post education decision by parent i in period t is
e if a i t >ã(g t+1 );
where g t+1 2 (0; h). Thus, unlike in the ex ante case, the ex post education decision is heterogeneous across the members of each generation. As shown later, the functionã(g t+1 ), depicted by Figure 3 , is strictly decreasing and discontinuous atg.
Macroeconomic Variables
By analogy to the baseline model in Section 2.3, the evolution of the working population is
In view of Eq. (22), this is a step function that drops once for all at g t+1 =g: The fall is due to the trade-o¤ relationship of fertility with the education plan, not with the actual education spending.
The dynamics of aggregate human capital is given by
h(e(a; g t+1 ); a; g t+1 ) + e ( a; g t+1 ) dF (a)
In comparison with Eq. (11) for the baseline case, the e¤ect of a change in g t+1 on the growth factor (g t+1 ) is complicated and may not necessarily be negative. The ambiguity is due to the irreversibility constraint that severs the trade-o¤ relationship between the quantity and quality of children. 26 It follows from Eqs. (26) and (27) that the average level of human capital in period t 1 is given by
and h 0 = H 0 =N 0 : This indicates two opposing forces of technology acceleration on h t : While a rise in g t depresses human capital directly through the erosion e¤ect, it increases the proportion of skilled workers in generation t. Despite the complexity, y t and A t grow at the same rate in a steady-state equilibrium where g t and thus h t are constant, as in the baseline model. Finally, the average fertility rate in period t is expressed as
A rise in g t+1 overg triggers education savings and thereby depresses n t through (g t+1 ),
and a change in g t ambiguously a¤ects n t through h t . Considering these properties, fertility dynamics display no general trend when g t rises monotonically over time.
The Dynamical System
The evolution of the economy is described in the same way as the baseline model, with the growth factor of aggregate human capital being the only di¤erence. By replacing (g t+1 ) in
Eq. (19) with (g t+1 ) in Eq. (27) and by using Eq. (20), one obtains
x t = g t+1 (g t+1 ) ;
x t+1 = g t+1 1 + g t+1 ;
(30) 26 In the presence of the irreversible fertility decision, there is no quantity-quality trade-o¤ as in Eq. (7); accordingly, a change in the critical ability levelã(g t+1 ) has an in ‡uence on (g t+1 ): See also Footnote 20.
where the initial innovation rate x 0 = H 0 =A 0 is determined by three exogenous factors: A 0 , N 0 ; and the distribution of h i 0 : These two equations constitute a one-dimensional …rst-order autonomous system for x t :
The nature of the dynamical system depends on whether or not technology grows faster than aggregate human capital. This question is investigated below with regard to two possible cases of g t+1 :
3.3.1 The Case of 0 < g t+1 g According to Eq. (22), households'education plan in this case is e p t = e ( a; g t+1 ) = 0;
leading to n i t = h i t = from Eq. (21). Households have no education plan and invest all child-rearing resources in the quantity of children. Given the initial plan, Eq. (25) reveals that the critical ability level for the ex post education decision is
where I (1 ) ( + e) 1 1:
Since I > 0 under Eq. (A2), it follows thatã I (ĝ) = 1,ã I ( h) = 0, andã I g (g t+1 ) < 0 8g t+1 > 0, whereĝ I h=(1 + I ). The last property means that education investment prevails with the acceleration of technological progress, as it works in favor of skilled workers.
Substitution of e ( a; g t+1 ) andã(g t+1 ) from Eqs. (31) and (32), respectively, into Eq. (27) reveals that the growth factor of aggregate human capital is, for g t+1 2 (0;g];
where lim g t+1 !0 I (g t+1 ) = h= > 1 under the demographic condition in Eq. (A1). Hence, if g t+1 is su¢ ciently small, (g t+1 ) > 1 + g t+1 and then Eq. (30) yields x t+1 > x t .
To analyze an economy that passes through the entire development process, we suppose that there is no steady-state equilibrium in which no one saves for children's education. Such a poverty trap is ruled out by assuming that
Recalling the de…nition ofg in Eq. (23), the inequality above holds if Eq. (A1) is satis…ed and if e is su¢ ciently small. 27
The resulting evolution of the economy is illustrated by Figure 4 . As can be seen, g t exhibits monotonic growth and eventually exceeds the critical level for education planning, g: The monotonicity of technology growth seems to be inconsistent with the productivity slowdown experienced by advanced economies in recent years. More important, however, from the viewpoint of this paper's objective, is the result that g t+1 remains aboveg after a certain period of time.
The Case of g t+1 >g
In light of Eqs. (21) and (22), households'planned level of education investment is e p t = e ( a; g t+1 ) = e;
leading to n i t = h i t =( + e) from Eq. (21). All households plan to invest in education by choosing smaller family sizes for a given amount of income. Then Eq. (25) shows that the critical ability level for the ex post education decision is
where II (1 ) + e (1 )( + e) 1 1 > 0:
Substitution of e ( a; g t+1 ) andã(g t+1 ) from Eqs. (34) and (35), respectively, into Eq. (27) reveals that the growth factor of aggregate human capital is, for g t+1 >g;
where II (g t+1 ) = 0 if and only if g t+1 = h=(1 a): This property, along with Eq. (A3) and the continuity of II (g t+1 ); ensures the existence of a nontrivial steady-state equilibrium in which g t stays at g minfg 2 R ++ j (g) = 1 + gg >g: The steady-state condition in the curly braces requires that technology and aggregate human capital grow at the same rate.
Given the results so far, Figure 4 shows that g t monotonically converges toward g as long as g 1 falls on the interval (0; g). 28 Otherwise, g t may converge to a higher level because the dynamical system may exhibit multiplicity of nontrivial steady-state equilibria. In any of the equilibria, technology, aggregate human capital, and output per worker grow at the same rate. The main result is summarized below.
Lemma 3 Consider the locked-in economy characterized by Eqs. (A2)-(A3): Given g 1 2 (0; g), the growth rate of technology monotonically converges toward g(>g):
A few technical remarks need to be made regarding Figure 4 . First, the diagram represents the case in which I (g) is smaller than II (g): While their quantitative relationship is generally ambiguous, this case is likely to occur unless e is above a certain level and the ability distribution is left-skewed. In Stage II, a high education cost discourages fertility whereas a left-skewed ability distribution limits the spread of education investment. Both of these e¤ects depress the growth factor II (g):
Second, in order to encompass the opposite case, I (g) > II (g), (g) needs to be a linear combination of I (g) and II (g) so that any x t on the interval (g= I (g);g= II (g)) has a corresponding value of g t+1 , which is equal tog: 29 Then, the education cost e needs to be su¢ ciently small so that Eq. (A3) is satis…ed, as in the …rst case. This is because, in light of Eqs. (23) and (36),g and II (g) respectively go to zero and to h= > 1 as e approaches zero.
Third, the curve g t+1 = (g t+1 ) is positively sloped on R ++ nfgg, so that x t has a one-to-one relationship with g t+1 in most circumstances. While the monotonicity of the curve is not essential for Lemma 3, a su¢ cient condition for this property is that aF 0 (a) is small enough for any a 2 (0; 1). This requires that the ability distribution is not heavily concentrated, especially around the upper tail. Fourth and …nally, the nontrivial steady-state equilibrium is unique if the function F ful…lls a similar condition. These results are asserted by Lemmas 8 and 9 in the Appendix.
Analysis
This section demonstrates a scenario of economic development in the presence of the irreversibility constraint on the fertility decision. As will become clear, the lock-in e¤ect on the growth performance is equivocal in the early stages of development, whereas it is necessarily negative in the later stages.
Let the economy start with a development stage characterized by a high fertility rate and a limited spread of education. As mentioned in the introduction, the focus here is not on underdeveloped stages in which some households rely on child labor (cf. Footnote 4). In 29 More precisely, (g) is modi…ed to
where p(x t ) is a single-valued function such that p(g= I (g)) = 0; p(g= II (g)) = 1; and p 0 (x t ) > 0 8x t 2 (g= I (g);g= II (g)): One may view p(x t ) as the probability with which each household observing x t chooses e p t = e when it is indi¤erent between the two ex ante choices, 0 and e: light of Eqs. (23) and (32), this assumes the following relationship betweenĝ;g; and g 1 :
whereĝ <g if the education cost e is su¢ ciently small. 30
Lett be the period after which g t+1 exceeds the critical level for education planning,g, for the …rst time; i.e., g t+1 g 8t t and g t+1 >g 8t >t. Then, the development process is divided into two stages. 
Stage I: Under-Investment in Education
In Stage I, where 0 t t andĝ < g t+1 g; all households aim to concentrate their resources on the quantity, rather than the quality, of children at the time of childbirth. receiving ability shocks in the range (ã (g t+1 );ã I (g t+1 )]: If fertility decision were reversible, they would reduce their family sizes to …nance the cost of schooling. 31 However, such an adjustment is in fact infeasible and education investment would incur a fall in consumption.
The Lock-in E¤ect on the Growth Process
The ability shocks to those households are not large enough for them to make such sacri…ces.
Whenã I (g t+1 ) >ã (g t+1 ); the economy in period t su¤ers from under-investment in education or, equivalently, of over-investment in the quantity of children. As Lemma 1 suggests earlier, the unconstrained parental choice is optimal for the formation of aggregate human capital, H t+1 , regardless of the child-rearing budget b i t . The irreversibility constraint prevents some households from making the choice and thereby distorts resource allocation between investment in the quantity and in the quality of labor. 32 The existence of the interval (ã (g t+1 );ã I (g t+1 )] is assured by Lemma 4 below, according to which Figure 3 is depicted.
Lemma 4 Under Eq. (A2),ã I (g t+1 ) >ã (g t+1 ) > 0 8g t+1 2 (0; h): 31 The discontinuity of h(e i t ; a i t ; g i t+1 ) with respect to e i t is not essential for the lock-in e¤ect on education decisions. If the function h was alternatively continuous with respect to e i t , the reaction function e(a i t ; g i t+1 ) would also be continuous with respect to a i t . Then, the irreversibility constraint would make the education reaction less sensitive to ability shocks. 32 Technically speaking, the education decision for a i t 2 (ã (g t+1 );ã I (g t+1 )] does not maximize the fraction in Eq. (13).
Proof. See Appendix A.
Despite the ine¢ cient resource allocation, the irreversibility constraint has an ambiguous e¤ect on the growth process in Stage I because it also increases child-rearing expenses, b i t , for some households. This counterforce is represented by the upward arrow in Figure  5 . Households who receive a shock a i t 2 [0;ã I (g t+1 )] follow the quantity-oriented plan in Eq. (31) and thus spend a …xed fraction of income on child rearing; i.e., b i t = h i t as in the unlocked economy in Section 2. By contrast, those with a i t 2 (ã I (g t+1 ); 1] invest in education against the initial plan. Because their family sizes cannot be reduced accordingly, the upward revision of the education plan results in more than h i t e¢ ciency units of labor devoted to their children. More precisely, b i t = h i t ( + e)= from Eq. (24). Such a self-sacri…ce is made only if the observed ability level is su¢ ciently large.
To summarize, the increase in child-rearing expenses has a positive impact on aggregate human capital, thereby negating the adverse e¤ect of under-investment in education. The resulting quantitative relationship of I (g t+1 ) to (g t+1 ); which re ‡ects the lock-in e¤ect on the growth process, is generally ambiguous in Stage I. Then the following proposition is established.
Proposition 1 (The Lock-in E¤ect in Stage I) Under Eqs. (A2)-(A4), the irreversibility constraint on fertility decisions has an ambiguous e¤ect on the growth process in Stage I.
A Redistribution Policy
This subsection examines the possibility of a redistribution policy that reallocates parenting resources between the quantity and quality of children and thereby enhances the growth performance in Stage I.
Suppose that the government of the economy temporarily imposes a tax w t g t on raising one child, while it provides a subsidy w t e g t for sending one child for higher education, where g t 0 and e g t 0: That is to say, the taxation is an obligation for all households (and thus is similar to imposing a poll tax), whereas the subsidy is targeted only at investors in child education. The policy scheme is announced by the time when individuals give birth to children. While the government fully knows about the entire economy, it cannot identify the ability levels of unborn children.
Under the circumstances, the aggregate amount of parenting resources, B t ; is expressed
where e + e g t is the subsidized education cost and 1 F (ã t ) is the fraction of households spending on education in period t. The government budget is supposed to be balanced and accordingly 33
With the balanced budget, the redistribution policy has no direct in ‡uence on B t and is controlled by an exogenous change in g t . Turning to the individual optimization, Eq. (31) is modi…ed to 34 e p t = 0 and n i t = + g t h i t :
As expected intuitively, a rise in g t increases the …xed cost of child rearing, thereby locking n i t into a smaller level. In view of Eq. (25), the critical ability level for the ex post education decision is, in Stage I,
where e g t is given by Eq. (38). Eq. (40) is reduced to Eq. (32) if g t = 0. Thus, the critical ability levelã t in Eq. (40) is expressed as a single-valued function such that, for g t+1 > 0
and g t = 0;ã whereã I (g t+1 ; 0) =ã I (g t+1 ):
Now, consider a redistribution policy that increases g t marginally at g t = 0: The policy e¤ects on the critical ability level are summarized by Lemma 5 below, in whichã I (g t+1 ; 0) denotes the derivative @ã I (g t+1 ; g t )=@ g t evaluated at g t = 0: 35
Lemma 5 Under Eq. (A2), (a)ã I (g t+1 ; 0) < 0 8g t+1 2 (ĝ; h);
(b)ã I (g t+1 ; 0) ! 1 as g t+1 !ĝ + 0:
Proof. See Appendix A.
Recalling Eq. (38), one can interpret these properties as follows. First, a rise in g t leads to a spread of education because the associated decrease in e g t lowers the hurdle to education investment for each household. As a result, a larger part of households choose e i t = e (a i t ; g t+1 ) and the policy mitigates under-investment in education in period t. 36 Second, the policy e¤ect becomes in…nitely large as g t+1 approachesĝ and thus asã I (g t+1 ) approaches 1. This is due to a certain amount of education subsidies provided to a small part of households.
The growth factor of aggregate human capital in Eq. (33) is now replaced with
whereã t =ã I (g t+1 ; g t ) and I (g t+1 ; 0) = I (g t+1 ): The fraction =( + g t ) above is associated with fertility, whereas the terms in the square brackets indicate the average level of human capital in period t + 1; h t+1 from Eq. (28). The aforementioned policy is effective if I (g t+1 ; 0) > 0. With this condition, the increasing g t is expected to shift the g t+1 = I (g t+1 ) curve in Figure 4 downward. The curve shifts back later as long as the policy is executed temporarily. The resulting increase in g t+1 expedites the transition to Stage II. 37 35 This notation applies to other functions in what follows. 36 Sinceã (g t+1 ) in Lemma 4 is the critical ability level for the education decision in the unlocked economy, it is immune from any policies executed by the locked-in economy. This is also the case for Lemma 6 and Figures 5-6 below. By contrast,ã (g t+1 ) used to de…neg in Eq. (8) is the critical ability level in ex ante optimization and thus is under an in ‡uence of those policies. 37 Nevertheless, output per capita may not necessarily increase because, as shown by Eq. (28), the acceleration of technology growth may have an ambiguous e¤ect on y t = A t h t .
A simple calculation reveals that the policy e¤ect is decomposed into two con ‡icting factors:
where the …rst and second terms on the right side, respectively, indicate the negative e¤ect on the quantity and the positive e¤ect on the quality of labor. Recalling Eq. (13), one …nds that the sign of I (g t+1 ; 0) is not necessarily positive: While the increase in g t improves under-investment in education, it has an ambiguous impact on the amount of child-rearing expenses, b i t . 38 We now take a closer look at Eq. (41). The quantity e¤ect is limited because I (g t+1 ) < h= 8g t+1 > 0; whereas the quality e¤ect may or may not be. It follows from Lemma 5 that as long as lim a!1 F 0 (a) > 0; the quality e¤ect is the determining factor when g t+1 is su¢ ciently close toĝ. Under the circumstances, the critical valueã I (g t+1 ) approaches the upper tail of the ability distribution, so that the education subsidy allows competent children to become skilled labor. The condition for F 0 (a) above ensures the existence of those bene…ciaries. Considering that g t+1 grows monotonically over time, one …nds that the policy is likely to be e¤ective in the early stages of development.
Stage II: Over-Investment in Education
When g t+1 exceedsg, the allocation of parenting resources in period t switches from a quantity-biased to a quality-biased approach. In Stage II, where t >t and g t+1 >g; all households prepare for future education by choosing small family sizes.
The Lock-in E¤ect on the Growth Process
The irreversibility constraint induces some households to invest in education, thereby shifting macroeconomic resource allocation from the quantity to the quality of children. The lock-in e¤ect is graphically represented by Figure 6 . The upward arrow shows that the constraint a¤ects the ex post decision of parents with a i t 2 (ã II (g t+1 );ã (g t+1 )]: While those households spend on education as planned in Eq. (34), they would not carry out the plan if the family Lemma 6 below, on which Figure 3 is based, ensures the existence of those constrained households. As follows from Lemma 1, their education and fertility decisions, e i t > e (a i t ; g t+1 ) and n i t = b i t =( +e i t ), are unfavorable for aggregate human capital H t+1 . In this sense, the economy su¤ers from over-investment in education or, equivalently, of under-investment in fertility. 39
There is another channel through which the irreversibility constraint retards human capital accumulation in Stage II. Unlike in the previous stage, it decreases the child-rearing 39 In this situation, education investment is not productive su¢ ciently for some workers. Since those workers earn wages appropriate to their skill levels, they are categorized as "apparently over-educated workers" in Chevalier (2003) . The author de…nes apparently over-educated workers as graduates being satis…ed with a non-graduate job and genuinely over-educated workers as those who are not. Using data on UK graduates from 1985 and from 1990, he reports that 483 out of 4844 graduates fall into the former category (p. 514, Table 1 ). budget for some households. This e¤ect is illustrated by the downward arrow in Figure 6 .
Households with a i t 2 [0;ã II (g t+1 )] …nd that observed abilities are too low to carry out the education plan in Eq. (34). Because the number of their children cannot be increased correspondingly, their ex post decision leads to a smaller fraction of income spent for their children; i.e., b i t < h i t from Eq. (24). In contrast, those who observe a i t 2 (ã II (g t+1 ); 1] follow the initial plan and allocate h i t e¢ ciency units of labor to child rearing as in the unlocked economy.
All things considered, the lock-in e¤ect on the growth process is necessarily negative in Stage II; i.e., II (g t+1 ) < (g t+1 ) 8g t+1 >g: Figure 4 illustrates the locked-in economy converging toward the lower steady-state equilibrium, g < g . Since technology A t ; aggregate human capital H t and output per worker y t grow at the same rate in the steady state, the following proposition is now derived.
Proposition 2 Under Eqs. (A2)-(A4), the irreversibility constraint on fertility decisions decelerates the growth process in Stage II and lowers the long-run growth rate of output per worker.
A Redistribution Policy
This subsection designs another type of redistribution policy, which may improve overinvestment in education and stimulate fertility with no direct in ‡uence on aggregate resources for child rearing, B t . Throughout Stage II, the government permanently provides a subsidy w t g t for raising one child (i.e., parenting support), while imposing a tax w t e g t on sending a low-ability child to higher education, where g t 0 and e g t 0: 40 In order to encourage child bearing, suppose that the education tax is targeted at households whose children are below average in ability. 41 Under the circumstances, B t is expressed by replacing 1 F (ã t ) in Eq. (37) with F ( a) 40 In reality, one may interpret the education tax considered here as the ability-based provision of a public scholarship. 41 More generally, one may choose any ability level on [ã t ; a] as the critical level for the education tax. Alternatively, if an ability level on ( a; 1] is chosen as the critical level, all adult individuals in Stage II expect to be subject to taxation at the time of childbirth. Such a policy would reduce rather than increase the quantity of children they intend to raise. For this reason, this section does not deal with an unconditional education policy as in Stage I. F (ã t ): The balanced budget constraint faced by the government yields
where the denominator is the fraction of households paying the education tax. 42 The ability distribution is fully known to the government as in Stage I. Increasing the subsidy (i.e., decreasing g t ) requires a heavier burden of the taxation. Also note that, with g t held constant, e g t goes to in…nity asã t approaches a: This result re ‡ects the situation in which a small fraction of households bear the cost of providing a certain amount of subsidies.
In the beginning of each period in Stage II, the policy scheme is announced and none of the adult individuals, who expect their children to be born with average ability, expects to be subject to taxation. Thus, the ex ante decisions given by Eq. (34) are modi…ed to e p t = e and n i t = + g t + e h i t :
Decreasing g t from zero lightens the …nancial burden of child rearing, thereby locking n i t into a higher level.
In order to analyze the ex post education decision, note thatã t < a in Stage II. Namely, households who are indi¤erent in their education decisions observe an ability level below average. Because they would be subject to taxation if they invested in education, Eq. (25) reveals that the critical ability level for this stage is rewritten as
where e g t is given by Eq. (42). Eq. (43) is reduced to Eq. (35) if g t = 0. Thus, the critical ability levelã t in Eq. (43) is expressed as a single-valued function such that, for g t+1 > 0
and g t = 0;ã Lemma 7 (a)ã II (g t+1 ; 0) < 0 8g t+1 2 (g; h);
(b)ã II (g t+1 ; 0) ! 0 as g t+1 ! h:
The results of Lemma 7 are understood intuitively by using Eq. (42). First, the decreasing g t limits the fraction of households investing in education, 1 F (ã t ); because the increased potential cost of education, e + e g t ; lifts the hurdle to schooling. The policy mitigates overinvestment in education by reducing the gap betweenã II (g t+1 ; g t ) and the critical ability level for the unlocked economy,ã (g t+1 ): Second, the policy e¤ect does not become in…nitely large as g t+1 approaches h and thus asã II (g t+1 ) approaches zero. This is in part because the tax burden on each tax payer, e g t ; is lightened in the situation where the total cost of the subsidy is borne by most households of below-average children.
Eq. (36) is now modi…ed to
whereã t =ã II (g t+1 ; g t ) and II (g t+1 ; 0) = II (g t+1 ). The terms in the square brackets represent the average level of human capital h t+1 : The redistribution policy is e¤ective provided that II (g t+1 ; 0) < 0. In this case, the decreasing g t is expected to cause a downward shift in the g t+1 = II (g t+1 ) curve from Figure 4 , leading to a rise in g t+1 . The permanent shift enhances the steady-state value g; which coincides with the long-run growth rate of output per worker. 43 Since the policy a¤ects the costs of child rearing, its in ‡uence on the growth factor II (g t+1 ) is decomposed into two components:
where the …rst and second terms on the right side, respectively, have negative and positive signs. They respectively indicate the positive e¤ect on the quantity and the negative e¤ect on the quality of labor. The sign of II (g t+1 ; 0) is not necessarily negative even though 43 Its short-term e¤ect on output per worker, y t , is less clear-cut because accelerated technological progress has two opposing e¤ects on h t [cf. Eq. (28)]. the decrease in g t mitigates over-investment in education. The ambiguity stems from the associated change in b i t in Eq. (13). In order to investigate Eq. (44) further, let g t+1 approach h from below. Then, the quantity e¤ect remains positive because II ( h) > 0. On the other hand,ã II (g t+1 ) becomes so small that the redistribution policy merely deprives incompetent children of access to education. From Lemma 7, the resulting quality e¤ect is limited and less signi…cant than the quantity e¤ect unless the ability distribution is concentrated at the bottom level (more precisely, unless lim a!0 F 0 (a) = 1). The policy then boosts aggregate human capital H t+1 and, thanks to the accompanying rise in the wage rate w t+1 = A t+1 , even those low ability children may bene…t from the policy.
Recalling Lemma 3 about the convergence of g t to g; the discussion above concludes that the redistribution policy is successful at least in the long run if h is su¢ ciently close to g. 44
Concluding Remarks
This theoretical research has elucidated the role of irreversible fertility decisions in economic growth from the long-run perspective. In the presence of unexpected ability shocks on children, the irreversibility constraint a¤ects the formation of aggregate human capital through parental decisions on child rearing, and its qualitative e¤ect varies with the stage of economic development.
In the underdeveloped stage, parents have no education plan and concentrate their childrearing resources on the quantity of children. Once the family size is …xed after childbirth, investing in education against the initial plan incurs an unexpected reduction in consumption.
The initial plan is therefore executed by all households except those who …nd their children signi…cantly competent. As a consequence, the irreversibility constraint not only increases aggregate resources for child rearing but also prevents skill acquisition of relatively competent children. While their overall e¤ect is generally ambiguous, the latter indicates that the 44 There is a set of structural parameters that make such a case feasible. The steady-state condition, II (g t+1 ) = 1 + g t+1 , reveals that a nontrivial steady-state equilibrium occurs at g t+1 = h if h = ( + e)=[ a ( + e)]: The implied condition, + e < a, is compatible with Eqs. (A1)-(A4) and also with the su¢ cient conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium, provided by Lemma 9 in the Appendix. If the steady-state equilibrium is unique, one can make g slightly smaller than h by changing II (g t+1 ) marginally through ; ; and e. government can enhance aggregate human capital by altering the resource allocation between the quantity and quality of children. One possibility is an ability-based education subsidy …nanced by universal taxation on child rearing. Such a redistribution policy tends to be e¤ective in early periods when the constraint is binding for children in the upper tail of the ability distribution, as assisting their skill acquisition makes a signi…cant contribution to aggregate human capital.
Technological progress fueled by human capital accumulation eventually alters households' (ex ante) stances toward education, which is followed by a major fertility decline. Now that family sizes are locked into smaller levels, investing in children's quality does not place a heavy …nancial burden on their parents, and such investment is necessary to make up for the reduced investment in children's quantity. The initial education plan is therefore executed by all but households who …nd their children in the bottom of the ability distribution. As a consequence, the irreversibility constraint unambiguously depresses the formation of human capital by decreasing aggregate resources for child rearing and by causing over-investment in education. The countermeasure proposed by this paper, which would be e¤ective in highly advanced economies, is to stimulate average fertility instead of educating low-ability children. Since the policy has an ambiguous in ‡uence on those children, who are induced to become unskilled labor, numerical analysis will be necessary for further assessment.
While the central thesis of the present research is intuitive, the theory developed above builds on several simplifying assumptions to be discussed. The …rst assumption is that individuals have no retirement period. If they lived on public pensions after retirement, the pension bene…ts they receive would depend on the proportion of the senior to the working population. This would be another reason for under-investment in the quantity of children to be reformed. The second is that siblings are identical within households, so that parents treat their children equally. Introducing sibling heterogeneity is expected to weaken the lock-in e¤ects because parents would allocate education budgets according to their children's abilities. The third is that fertility choices are continuous. In order to cope with the education cost for children, parents are able to reduce their family sizes as much as they want. In reality, however, it is impossible to invest in education for less than one unit of children. With the discreteness of fertility choices, the irreversibility constraint would lock family sizes into higher levels and possibly mitigate over-investment in education in developed stages. The fourth is that the economy is not exposed to any demographic changes attributable to, for instance, immigration or emigration. The former would increase the working population, whereas the latter would be associated with a brain drain. It is worth investigating how they a¤ect the macroeconomic problem of resource allocation between the quantity and quality of labor. These issues should be addressed in future research.
Appendix

A Proofs
Lemma 8 Under Eq. (A2), I (g t+1 )=g t+1 and II (g t+1 )=g t+1 are strictly decreasing in g t+1 on R ++ if aF 0 (a) < 1= I 8a 2 (0; 1):
Proof. Eq. (32) shows that 0 <ã I (g t+1 ) < 1 if and only if g t+1 2 (ĝ; h): Then it follows from Eq. (33) that for any g t+1 2 R ++ nfĝ; hg;
[1 I ã I (g t+1 )F 0 (ã I (g t+1 ))];
where I > 0 under Eq. (A2). The derivative above has a negative sign for any g t+1 2 (ĝ; h)
if aF 0 (a) is smaller than 1= I for any a 2 (0; 1). The negative sign also holds for any g t+1 2 R ++ n[ĝ; h]; because in this caseã I (g t+1 ) > 1 orã I (g t+1 ) < 0 and thus F 0 (ã I (g t+1 )) = 0.
On the other hand, Eq. (35) reveals that 0 <ã II (g t+1 ) < 1 if and only if g t+1 2 ( g; h); where g is de…ned as a critical value such thatã II ( g) = 1: Then, it follows from Eq. (36) that for any g t+1 2 R ++ nf g; hg;
d[ II (g t+1 )=g t+1 ] dg t+1 = + e h g 2 t+1 [1 II ã II (g t+1 )F 0 (ã II (g t+1 ))];
where II < I : In a similar fashion, one …nds that the derivative above has a negative sign for any g t+1 2 R ++ nf g; hg under the same assumption. Lemma 8 is established by these results, along with the continuity of I (g t+1 ) and II (g t+1 ) on R ++ . expected-utility framework makes the functionã(g t+1 ) continuous at any point on (0; h): On the other hand, as in the diagram, this function has a decreasing property andã(ĝ) = 1.
Correspondingly, rede…neg as a critical level of g t+1 for whichã(g t+1 ) =ã (g t+1 ): In other words, (g t+1 ) = e for g t+1 =g;
using Eqs. (8) and (49). Since I > e= > II as implied by Lemmas 4 and 6, the properties of (g t+1 ) ensure thatg exists uniquely and a(g t+1 ) 8 > > > < > > > :
>ã (g t+1 ) for g t+1 2 (0;g); =ã (g t+1 ) for g t+1 =g;
<ã (g t+1 ) for g t+1 2 (g; h):
Consistent with Section 4, this indicates that the economy goes through under-and then over-investment in education as g t+1 increases. Notes: The diagram depicts the negative relationship between the growth rate of technology, g t+1 , and the critical ability level for education,ã (g t+1 ): A fall inã (g t+1 ) implies a higher ratio of households investing in education in period t. The spread of education is attributed to the skill-biased technological progress. Notes: The diagram depicts the relationship between the growth rate of technology and the critical ability level for education in the locked-in economy,ã t , in comparison with the one for the unconstrained case, a t .ã t decreases as g t+1 increases, and its quantitative relationship with a t reverses when g t+1 crosses overg: Figure 2 . The Evolution of Technology for the Unlocked Economy. Notes: For any x 0 > 0, the innovation rate, x t , and the growth rate of technology, g t , monotonically converge toward their respective steady-state levels, x and g : Figure 4 . The Evolution of Technology for the Locked-in Economy.
Figure Captions
Notes: The growth rate of technology, g t , monotonically increases over time as long as the initial innovation rate x 0 is su¢ ciently small. It eventually exceeds the critical level for the fertility decision,g, and converges towards the steady-state level g: Figure 5 . The Lock-in E¤ects on Education and Parenting Resources in Stage I. Notes: The diagram depicts the lock-in e¤ects on the amount of e¢ cient labor devoted to children, b i t , and on the education decision, e i t . As the upward and downward arrows respectively indicate, the irreversibility constraint induces households on the interval (ã I (g t+1 ); 1] to spend more for their children, whereas it prevents those on (ã (g t+1 );ã I (g t+1 )] from investing in child education. Figure 5 , the diagram shows that the irreversibility constraint induces households on the interval [0;ã II (g t+1 )] to spend less for their children, whereas it induces those on (ã II (g t+1 );ã (g t+1 )] to invest in education.
